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Artikel ini menjelaskan tentang implementasi kebijakan luar negeri “Equi-Balancing” Filipina terhadap China 
dalam sengketa Laut China Selatan (LCS). Artikel ini berpendapat bahwa untuk melindungi kepentingan 
nasional utamanya, Filipina harus dapat mengelola hubungan konstruktifnya dengan China. Untuk itu, 
Filipina di bawah pemerintahan Rodrigo Duterte merumuskan dan melaksanakan diplomasi maritim 
kooperatif terhadap China. Tujuan utama dari diplomasi maritim kooperatif ini adalah semakin 
mendekatkan hubungan Filipina-China dan di sisi lain, menjaga jarak diplomatik dengan Amerika Serikat 
dalam masalah Laut China Selatan. Artikel ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dalam menjelaskan 
implementasi diplomasi maritim kooperatif di atas. Untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut, Filipina telah 
melakukan beberapa tindakan konkrit dengan membangun: softpower, self confidence dan koalisi. 





This article explicates the implementation of “Equi-Balancing” foreign policy of the Philippines toward China 
in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. It argues that in order to protects its core national interests, Philippines 
should be able to manage its constructive relations with China. In order to do so, Philippines under the 
Rodrigo Duterte administration formulated and implemented cooperative maritime diplomacy to China. 
The main objectives of this cooperative maritime diplomacy were creating a closer the Philippines-China 
relations and on the hand, making some diplomatic distance to the United States in the SCS issue. This 
article utilises qualitative research method in deciphering the above cooperative maritime diplomacy. To 
achieve these goals, the Philippines has conducted several concrete actions by building: its sofpower, self 
confidence and coalition.  














South China Sea (SCS) is one of the very critical trade routes for the international shipping lanes; it 
also becomes one of the important gateways for economic and strategic sub-region of Indo-pacific (Lowy 
Institute, 2020). Further, SCS is contained with the source of hydrocarbons specifically in natural gas with 
competing claims of the different ownership over the sea and the resources (EIA, 2019). Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) estimates that there are, at least, around 11 billion barrel of oil reserves and around 
190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves located in the SCS region(EIA, 2019). 
The tensions and dispute in the SCS, particularly between China and the Philippines were started 
when China started to publish the Nine dash line maps in 2012. Nine-dash-line is a line that limited sea 
stretch from China’s southern coast through the South China Sea(Fisher, 2016). For China, the sovereignty 
over four islands in SCS including Pratas Island, the Macclesfield Bank Island, Paracel Island and the Spratly 
Island are owned by for more than two centuries ago (CNN, 2016).  
These territorial disputes between both countries have changed significantly in 2016 where there 
was a switching administration from former president Benigno Aquino to Rodrigo Duterte. Under Duterte 
administration, he decided to change the foreign policy of the Philippines to pursue the “Independent 
Foreign Policy”. This foreign policy aims to maintain good relations with the major powers and not to take 
sides with any great powers. (DFA of the Philippines, 2016). Less than three months in the office and 
following the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) landmark award to the Philippines in the territorial 
disputes with China in SCS, President Duterte released the diplomatic measures to get China’s goodwill 
(Castro, Renato Cruz De, 2016). He reduces the tension in SCS in the ASEAN summit in Laos in an attempt 
to earn the diplomatic and economic concessions from China. 
President Duterte stated that he wants to distance the Philippine’s relations with the US and 
stopped joining the US navy to patrolling in SCS to avoid Beijing’s upset (Castro, Renato Cruz De, 2016). 
Duterte also stated that he wanted American Special Forces that supported the Armed Forces of Philippines 
(AFP) operations in countering terrorism in Mindanao to withdraw from the island (Castro, Renato Cruz De, 
2016). While he was distancing Philippines relations with the US, President Duterte has pursued the equi-
balancing policy which aims to closer the Philippines’ relation with China. In order to win China’s trust on 
the Philippines, President Duterte declared that the result of PCA on July 12 which won by the Philippines 
is purely a bilateral issue between both countries, not the matter for the ASEAN to echoing Chinese position 
in this matter(Oxford Daily Brief Service, 2016). 
This article aims at responding the question on how Philippines responds China’s assertive behavior 
in the South China Sea. More specicifically, this article deciphers how Philippines implement its cooperative 
maritime diplomacy to respond China behavior in the South China Sea. This article is divided into four 
sections. In the first section, it explains about the theory and concept that will be employed in this article.  
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The second section discusses about the type of methodology that will be used in this article. In the third 
section, this article explicates the Philippines’ cooperative maritime diplomacy implementation to manage 
the constructive bilateral relations with China in the SCS dispute to protect the Philippines’ national 
interests. The Last section is the conclusion of this article. 
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
The main paradigm in this article is Neo-Realism. This paradigm is concerned about the structure 
of international and regional systems. Moreover, neorealism also explains how the countries have to show 
their capabilities to achieve their national interest.  
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework Mind Map
 
Generally, Neo-Realist argues that states are the highest level in the international system. According 
to Kenneth Waltz, the international system is known as a self-help system where the states are ready to 
satisfy the other countries in only specific conditions (Haetami, 2019). As Neo-Realist also argues that 
national interests of any nation-states are the most important driving force of their foreign policy behavior. 
In this context, a nation-state may reconcile the influences of international environment/system with its 
national interests. This would be applied with the case of Philippines’ foreign policy toward China in the 
SCS. In one hand, Philippines seriously considered the influences of the international system as the essential 
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external sources of its foreign policy, but on the other hand, Philippines has taken its national interests as 
the most pivotal source of its foreign policy in dealing with China. 
The state policymaker will balance their own state conditions in order to attain and to earn their 
self-help system. The economic capabilities of a country will equally the same as the military power 
(Haetami, 2019). In the SCS dispute, Philippines’ political interest is to protect Spartly Island and to pursue 
the bilateral relations with china. The security interest is to preserve the sovereignty and the integrity of 
national territory. The economy interest in South China Sea is to protect and manage the natural resources 
and the economic infrastructure in the SCS which will support Philippine’s economic growth and 
development (EIA, 2019). 
The other essential concept used in this article is maritime diplomacy. This concept can be 
understood as the way or strategy to maintain the relations through the maritime domain or the use of 
maritime to manage relations (LeMiere, 2016). In other words, maritime diplomacy is employed by a nation-
state as an essential instrument in the foreign policy implementation in the maritime domain. As has been 
mentioned earlier, Philippines employs maritime diplomacy as the instument of its equi-balance foreign 
policy to respond China’s behavior in the SCS. Conceptually, maritime diplomacy consists of three 
categorizations, namely: cooperative maritime diplomacy, persuasive maritime diplomacy and coercive 
maritime diplomacy(LeMiere, 2016). Cooperative maritime diplomacy is the using of soft power to manage 
the relations in the maritime domain; such as negotiations (LeMiere, 2016). Persuasive maritime diplomacy 
is the way of diplomacy that using the “influence”, or to ask the target to follow what their interests is in the 
maritime domain. Persuasive maritime diplomacy is different from cooperative maritime diplomacy which 
is  lack of collaboration or negotiation in managing maritime relations. While Coercive diplomacy or known 
as Gunboat diplomacy is the use or the implementation of diplomacy through hard power or naval 
capabilities in order to maintain their maritime relations (LeMiere, 2016). 
In line with the above categorization of maritime diplomacy, this article discusses the Philippine’s 
implementation of cooperative maritime diplomacy towards China in the South China Sea dispute (2016 – 
2020). The cooperative maritime diplomacy that used by Philippine can be classified as an instrument in  
the implementation of Duterte’s new ‘equi-balancing‘ foreign policy which is also the part of independent 
foreign policy toward China in the SCS  (Philippines Embassy, 2016). 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This article uses qualitative research method. Qualitative method is the type of scientific research 
to collect data from different study’s perspectives. This research utlized primary and secondary data. For 
primary data, the writers use the official published reports from official government such as Philippines’ 
embassy, Permanent Court of Arbitration Press Release Document 2016, as well as an official statement or 
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document from the official websites of the government of the Philippines’. For the Secondary data, this 
article manages to use some books, journal articles written by the expert or scholars, and online websites 
pertinent to the case study. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Rodrigo Duterte’s “Equi-Balancing” Policy Strategy towards the Philippines’ Relations with the 
United States and China. 
 After Duterte came to power, he started to implement the equi balancing strategy towards the 
Philippines’ relations with the major powers. The equi balancing strategy aims to pursue the closer relations 
with China in order to gain China’s support on the economic aspects and to distance the Philippines 
relations with its allies, United States (Castro, Renato Cruz De, 2016). Not only distancing the Philippines’ 
relations, but the Philippines’ was also implementing the security separation with US and ended the joint 
military exercises in the South China Sea dispute. 
Under Duterte’s administration, he was planning to distance the Philippines’ relations with the US. 
On September 13, 2016, Duterte’s announced that he would end the joint patrol between both Philippines’ 
and United States in the SCS, not only that, he also stated that the Philippines’ navy have to limit the patrol 
in the country territorial waters in order to prevent the provocation from other neighborhood countries. 
During the ASEAN summit and the East Asian summit (EAS) in Laos, Duterte has given the critical speech to 
the former US president, Barrack Obama which caused the cancellation of the bilateral meeting between 
both leaders. 
 
The Termination of The Philippines’ – US Joint Military Operations in Mindanao and Exercises in the 
South China Sea 2016 
Continuing from the cancellation of the bilateral meeting between Rodrigo Duterte and Barack 
Obama, on September 12 2016, Duterte announced that the US special forces that operating in the 
Mindanao for their counter terrorism operation had to leave the country, not only that Duterte’s also blamed 
their presence could extended the conflict in the South China Sea(Aljazeera, 2016).  
The US Special Forces was sent to the Southern Philippines’ in order to help and provides the 
intelligence and the Philippines armed force to fight against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist groups which  have 
linked to ISIS and Al Qaeda  in the Southern Philippines’(Gomez, 2016). Duterte’s also stated and warned 
that the Abu Sayyaf terrorism could kidnapping them if the American troops still staying there which might 
cause more complicated problems  in  Mindanao (Castro, Renato Cruz De, 2016). Later, Duterte stated that 
the Philippines’ Navy would also stop joint patrol with the United States Navy in the Philippines’ Exclusive 
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Economic Zone (EEZ) which located in the South China Sea region in order to prevent China aggressive 
behavior.  
Not only that, Perfecto Yasay, the Philippines’ foreign secretary, also added that the Philippines’ 
relations with the US regarding the joint patrol in the SCS can be seen as the provocative act by China which 
may cause the difficulties to peacefully solve the tension in the SCS between the Philippines’ and China. In 
September 2017 during the Duterte’s state visit to Vietnam, he has announced that the Joint military 
between the Philippines’ and the US military exercises which started since 4-12 October 2016 were the last 
military exercises between both countries under his administration. Duterte also stated that he pledged to 
honor the longstanding defense treaty with the United States, besides that the statement which given by 
Duterte regarding the termination of the Philippines’ and US joint military exercises was seen as a strongest 
indications of the slow breakdown towards the alliance that under Obama administration has tried to hold 
back the US rebalancing to the Asia(Castro, Renato Cruz De, 2016). During Duterte state visit to China in 
October 21, 2016, he announced the Philippines’ separation from the US and Duterte has stated that the 
Philippines and China will ready to solve the SCS dispute through bilateral negotiations(Castro, Renato Cruz 
De, 2016).  
 
The Forms and The Goals of the Philippines’ Cooperative Maritime Diplomacy 
The implementation of the Philippines’ independent foreign policy under Duterte administration 
was started by the Philippines’ effort to balance its relations with China in order to solve the tension in the 
South China Sea by creating the equi balancing policy which also the part of the independent foreign policy.  
In order to support the success of equi balancing policy, the Philippines has implemented the cooperative 
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Figure 2: The Philippines’s Maritime Diplomacy: The Forms and The Goals 
 
Source: compiled by the authors from various sources 
 The figure above explains about the Philippines’ cooperative maritime diplomacy implementation 
in dealing with China in the South China Sea dispute. The nature of this cooperative maritime diplomacy 
can be classified into several actions. First, to conducts the state visit (very high-level state visits). Second is 
to conduct the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) in the SCS, and third is to conducts the Joint Coast 
Guard Committee (JCGC) between China Coast Guard (CCG) and the Philippines’ coast guard (PCG). There 
were three steps of cooperative maritime diplomacy that the Philippines’ implemented to China: First is the 
soft power building, soft power building is used by the Philippines in order to earn China’s trust by 
conducting the state visit to China to pursue more constructive bilateral relations between the two 
countries. Second is the confidence building. This step was taken to increase further mutual trusts and 
confidence between China and Philippines bilateral relations by implementing the Bilateral Consultation 
Mechanism (BCM) (The Departement of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, 2019). BCM is one of the maritime 
diplomacy implementations in the form of confidence building to increase the mutual trust and confidence 
among both countries.  
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By join the BCM with China,  Philippines can manage the proper maritime incidents in the sea and 
increasing the maritime cooperation among both states in the SCS(The Departement of Foreign Affairs of 
the Philippines, 2019). With BCM, both countries can work together to maintain the regional peace and 
stability and to achieve the mutual goals and common interests in South China Sea. The BCM is one of the 
Philippine approaches to solve the maritime dispute with China and with BCM both countries have agreed 
to accelerate the negotiation without the use of force or hard power. In the other hand, Joint Coast Guard 
Committees (JCGC) is also the form of maritime diplomacy implementation in the maritime security aspects, 
by JCGC between both countries, it could protects and control the maritime areas in the South China Sea 
region from the transnational crimes and conducting environment protection(PCG, 2017). 
The Last action is the coalition building. This action was implemented after the Philippines has 
succeeded to implement the soft power building and confidence building to China. This action serves as a 
strategy to achieve the Philippines’ national interests by conducting the Joint Coast Guard Committee 
(JCGC) between China Coast Guard (CCG) and the Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) which officially signed 
during Duterte’s state visit to China in 2016. The agreements were made to strengthen the bond between 
two allies in protecting the SCS region from the transnational and national crimes (LeMiere, 2016). 
 
The Economic Aspects of Philippines’ Cooperative Maritime Diplomacy Implementation to China. 
 
Under Duterte’s administration, he has emphasized more on the economic aspects. The economic 
policy was emphasized more on the macroeconomic stability, foreign investment and most importantly in 
the aspect of infrastructure development to promote the agricultural productivity and industrialization 
(Renato Cruz De Castro, 2018). As he believes that the fallen of the Philippines was caused by the poor 
infrastructure, he started to prioritize the development of the Philippines’ infrastructure as it would create 
the employment and could reduce the inequality and poverty (Renato Cruz De Castro, 2018). Due to the 
huge Philippines’ needs in economic aspects, Duterte has succeeded to create the independent foreign 
policy and equi balancing policy to attract more investment from China.  
In 2016, Duterte visited China to renew their partnership. During the first meeting of both leaders, 
Xi Jinping endorsed Manila and Beijing to have to better coordinatation and working closer together in the 
One Belt One Road framework. After the meeting, Duterte and Xi Jinping agreed to have closer bilateral 
relations in economy such as in the construction of infrastructure (Renato Cruz De Castro, 2018). The equi 
balancing strategy is used to build the positive political atmosphere between China and Philippine bilateral 
relations where it builds the possibility of both countries to started to develop the infrastructure projects 
and main investment as the form of Cooperation that can create the trust and confidence building between 
China and Philippine in the SCS case(Castro, Renato Cruz De, 2016). 
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Rodrigo Duterte’s State Visit to China Towards the Case of The South China Sea In 2016 
The Philippines’ – China Joint Statement Plan. 
 
Two years since Duterte’s came to power, the relations between the Philippines and China have 
achieved more positive turnaround and a having a good momentum in the development (Jianwei, 2018). 
The implementation of his equi balancing policy can be seen when Duterte conducted the state visit to the 
China on October 2016. After that meeting, the Philippines and China were slowly able to strengthen the 
common trust-building(Renato Cruz De Castro, 2018).  
To implement the soft power building to China and to earn China’s trusts, Duterte made a three 
days state visit to China to discuss and build the economic relations between both countries. The matrix 
below is provided by the writers to summarize the Philippines’ president, Rodrigo Duterte’s state visit to 
China in 2016. 
Figure 3: Duterte’s State Visit in 2016 Matrix(The Philippines' Presidential Communications Operations 
Office, 2016) 
 
From the figure above we can see that, the two learders discussed about the economic bilateral 
relations of both countries (The Philippines' Presidential Communications Operations Office, 2016). Besides, 
they also discussed about the importance of maintaining and promoting peace in the SCS. There were 13 
lists of documents signed and mostly on the economic aspects. Duterte also stated that the agreements 
would also provide the new framework to intensify both countries cooperation and also could upgrade the 
optimism in their trade relations (The Philippines' Presidential Communications Operations Office, 2016).  
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Table 4: the Philippines’ – China List of Signed Cooperation Documents 2016(Department of 
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines', 2016) 
 
From the two tables above (table 5), we can see that there were 13 lists of agreements mostly on 
economic aspects which signed in October 21, 2016. In the end of the joint statements, Duterte was also 
stated that he would provide the framework to intensify the cooperation of both countries relations (The 
Philippines' Presidential Communications Operations Office, 2016). Not only that, during Duterte’s state 
visit to China, he also emphasized that his visit to China was a form of the turning point where both country 
can work together and showing their capability in the mutual cooperation that could bring advantage to 
both countries and keep maintaining the commitment to solve the South China Sea dispute in the peaceful 
way (The Philippines' Presidential Communications Operations Office, 2016).  
Duterte conducted the second state visit to Beijing in order to participate in the “Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation (BRF)” which was held by China  on In May 13 to 15, 2017 along with 
other 29 world leaders (Embassy of the Philippines', 2020). Continued from the previous China and the 
Philippines’ meeting discussion, Duterte was invited the China government in order to conduct the state 
visit in Manila. As a response to that invitation, China Prime Minister, Li Keqiang, conducted the state visit 
to Philippines’ from 15-16 November 2017(Embassy of the Philippines', 2020). During the meetings, Li 
Keqiang and Duterte were having the view exchanged regarding China and the Philippines’ relations as well 
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discussed about the regional and international maritime issues. The meeting was resulted both countries 
were signed the 14 Government to Government Agreements and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
(Embassy of the Philippines', 2020). 
Figure 5: Duterte upgraded state visit in 2017 Matrix 
 
The tables below were the results from Duterte second times state visit to the China in 2017 to 
upgrade and expand further the China and Philippines’ bilateral relations not only in economy, but also in 
socio-economic and security.  
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Table 6: China and Philippines update joint statement 2017(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People's Republic of China, 2017)
 
 
Philippine - China Joint Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on SCS (2017-2019) 
As the continuity from Duterte’s the state visit to China in October 2016, the Philippines’ and China 
were agreed to conducts the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) in the South China Sea which signed 
in 2016. The Bilateral Consultation Mechanism is a form of confidence building between China and the 
Philippines in order to earn the mutual confidence and trust. Besides, it also could control the 
aggressiveness of both countries to prevent the both countries to conduct the military activities in the South 
China Sea which will affects to the both countries peace and stability (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People's Republic of China, 2017).  
The figure below is the summary and the results of both countries which agreed to conduct the 





Figure 7: the Philippines’- China Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) Plan in South China Sea  




Source: compiled by the authors from various sources 
 
As it can be seen from the table above, there were three meetings that held by the Philippines and 
China. During the first meeting, both countries have conducted view exchanged regarding the issue of 
South China Sea, and also discussed about the promotion regarding the maritime practical cooperation and 
the possibility for both sides to create the technical working group to solve the tension in SCS (Department 
of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, 2017). While during the second meeting, they discussed and 
emphasized the commitment to the effective and full implementation of 2002 Declaration on the Code of 
Conduct Parties in the SCS. Not only that, both countries also having the discussion and view exchanged 
about the ways to strengthen the cooperation of both countries such as in marine environment protection 
and fisheries. Lastly, the meeting also discussed about the mutual benefits to joint initiative and the 
consensus on the convening of the technical working group in the fisheries, oil and gas, marine 
environmental protection and political security areas in the framework of BCM(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
the People's Republic of China, 2018). During the third meeting, both sides discussed about the ways to 
increase the level and scope maritime cooperation areas in the SCS development that could bring the 
security and political advantages for both countries, such as: marine search and rescue, maritime safety, 
marine environment protection, and also fisheries which relevant to the working group meeting under the 
BCM framework. Both countries also discussed about the possibility to conduct joint explorations and 
development in the oil and gas sector (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 2018). 
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During the first Bilateral Consultation Mechanism meeting on South China Sea which held in 
Guiyang, China on 19 May 2017, the meeting was represented by the Philippines ambassador to China, Jose 
Santiago L. Sta Romana and for the China representative was represented by Chinese Vise Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Liu Zhenmin and also led the delegation to the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism. During 
the first meetings, both countries representative discussed and exchanged the view regarding the South 
China Sea issue in depth and friendly manner where both countries emphasized the assertiveness of their 
commitment to cooperate and looking for ways forwards in order to build the mutual trust and to build the 
confidence between China and Philippines (Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, 2017).  
According to the Joint Statement which was released on October 2016, both sides have agreed to 
move forward to discuss about the confidence building measures in order to increase the trust each other 
and to prevent both sides to conducting the activities in the South China Sea which could worsen both 
countries relations and could increase the tension in the South China Sea which also could impacted to the 
stability and also peace. In this case, the BCM is useful for both countries that would meet regularly and 
discuss on the current and further common issues in the SCS. Not only that, both countries China and the 
Philippines’ have also agreed to explore and upgrade the cooperation in other areas (Department of Foreign 
Affairs of the Philippines, 2017). The head of the delegations also initiated on the Term of Reference which 
both countries have agreed to becomes the platform for “the confidence building measures and also 
promoting on the maritime cooperation and security”.  
In the second meeting of Bilateral Consultation Mechanism which held in the Manila, Philippines’ 
on 13 February 2018. In this meeting, China representative and the delegation was led by the Vice Foreign 
Minister Kong Xuanyou, and the Philippines representatives was represented by the Undersecretary for 
Policy at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Enrique A. Manalo. During the meetings, both countries have 
emphasized more on their commitment to the effective and full implementation from “the 2002 Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS”.   Not only that, both countries were having the discussion and view 
exchanged about the ways to strengthen the cooperation of the both countries such as in the marine 
environmental protection, fisheries, marine scientific research and also on oil and gas without reducing both 
position on its sovereignty, sovereign rights, and the jurisdiction (Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People's 
Republic of China, 2018). There was also the intensive discussion on the mutual benefit to Joint initiative 
and also the consensus on the convening of the technical working group in the “fisheries, oil and gas, marine 
environmental protection, marine scientific research and political security areas” in the BCM framework. 
During the meeting, the working group has identified the possibility for both countries to do cooperative 
initiatives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People's Republic of China, 2018). 
The third Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) meetings was held in Beijing, China on 18 
October 2018. During the meeting, China delegations was led by Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou and 
while the Philippines’ was represented by DFA Undersecretary for Policy, Enrique A. Manalo(Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 2018). Having considered  that the proper management 
in the SCS dispute was very important in maintaining the peace and the stability in regional, both sides have 
emphasized more on both commitment to the principles of “freedom of navigation in and over flight in the 
SCS region, the freedom of international commerce and also other peaceful use of the sea, handling the 
territorial dispute and jurisdiction in the peaceful way without using the hard power” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 2018). Besides that, both countries also re-emphasized the 
important of commitment for the full and effective implementation of the “2002 Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the SCS” (DOC) in general and working together with the other ASEAN members which headed 
to the early consensus on the Code of Conduct in the SCS (COC). During the meetings, both countries were 
having the discussion and view exchanged about the ways to increase the maritime cooperation area such 
as in the SCS development which bring “the political and security implication, maritime research and rescue, 
maritime safety, maritime environmental protection and fisheries” in relevant with the working group 
meetings under the BCM framework(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 2018). 
Without reducing both countries portion on its sovereignty and sovereign rights and jurisdiction, both 
countries also discussed about the possibility to “joint exploration and development in the maritime oil and 
gas” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 2018). 
While, the fourth Bilateral Consultation Mechanism meeting was held on April 2-3, 2019 in Manila. 
The Chinese representative was led by the Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou and the Philippines’ was 
represented by the Foreign Affairs Assistant, Secretary Meynardo LB. Montealegre from the office of Asian 
and Pacific Affairs (Xu Yi, 2019). In this meeting, both countries have emphasized that BCM is a forum that 
plays significant roles to create a steady development of bilateral relations. Both countries also emphasized 
the tensions in the SCS should not be ignored and the importance of maintaining and promoting regional 
peace and stability in the SCS are imperative not only for both countries but also for the region as a whole. 
Both sides were having view exchanges on ways to increase the maritime cooperation regarding the current 
development in the SCS that brings political and security implications, maritime search and rescue, marine 
environmental protection, marine safety and fishery in the Working Group meetings and under the BCM 
framework (FMPRC, 2019).  
Both sides laso admitted the importance of the multilateral platform such as ASEAN-China Dialogue 
Relations, East and Asia Summit, and ASEAN Regional Forum in promoting peace and security in the SCS 
region. As closing statements, both sides reemphasized on their commitment on the full and effective 
implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS and agreed to maintain the 
positive momentum of the negotiation towards the conclusion of a Code of Conducts in the SCS that based 
on the consensus (The Departement of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, 2019). 
The fifth meeting of the BCM on the SCS was held on October 28, 2019, in Beijing. The Philippines 
delegation was led by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary, Enrique A. Manalo and China delegation was led by 
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Vice Foreign Minister, Luo Zhaohui (Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, 2019). During the 
meetings, both sides were having view exchanges regarding the general issues of concern in the SCS and 
both countries maritime issues. Both sides admitted the needs to solve the SCS dispute and to review the 
progress on maritime cooperation in different fields. The working groups of the BCM on political security, 
Fisheries cooperation, marine environmental protection, and marine scientific research were formed. Both 
sides were also having further concerned issues which encompass the maritime search and rescue, marine 
research, marine safety and fisheries cooperation in the SCS (Department of Foreign Affairs of the 
Philippines, 2019).  
 
The Philippines - China Maritime Cooperation Joint Coast Guard Committees (JCGC) between Two 
Coast Guards in the South China Sea (2017-2019). 
 
The agreement of Joint Coast Guard between both countries was signed by Xi Jinping and Rodrigo 
Duterte, during Duterte’s state visit in 2016. The two countries have agreed to have joint statement on the 
economic aspects as well as on the security aspect.  
The implementation of the Joint committee between two coast guards in the SCS was started in 
2016 where the Joint Coast Guard First Organizational Meeting of the the Philippines’ Coast Guard (PCG) 
and China Coast Guard (CCG) was held on 15-16 December which located in Manila, Philippines. The Joint 
Coast Guard Committee (JCGC) was used as the venue for both coast guard to further strengthen the mutual 
trust, also as a form of coalition building and confidence building to build more intensive communications 
between both countries and increase the friendly cooperation in maritime domain (Dizon, 2016). During the 
first meeting, both countries were doing the view exchange regarding the establishment of the JCGC, 
including the principles of the organizational structure, Terms of Reference (TOR), and some operational 
procedure(Xinhua, 2016). Not only that, both sides have also discussed about the possibility to conduct the 
maritime cooperation programs such as: combating illegal trafficking, maritime crimes, marine 
environmental protection, maritime search and rescue and capacity building in related area(Xinhua, 2016). 
During the meeting both countries were also having the substantial discussions about the temporary 
settings for the proposed hotline communication, and both countries have agreed to hold the inaugural 
meeting and the second organizational meeting in February 2017 which would be held in the 
Philippines(Xinhua, 2016). 
The Philippines’ Coast Guard (PCG) and China Coast Guard (CCG) was hold the Inaugural meeting 
of Joint Coast Guard Committee (JCGC) and the Second Organizational Meeting on 20-22 February 2017 
which were located in the Subic Bay, Philippines (Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines', 2017). 
The meeting was held in order to implement the MOU between the Philippines Coast Guard and China 
Coast Guard about the formation of the JCGC on the maritime cooperation which has been signed in 2016 
between the two leaders, Xi Jinping and Rodrigo Duterte. During the inaugural meeting of the JCGC, the 
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undersecretary of the Maritime sector of the Departement of Transportation, Hon Felipe. A. Judan delivered 
the speech about the Philippines’ strong support on the Coast Guard Diplomacy which advocated by the 
PCG and CCG. He also stated that the “mutual understanding, friendship and cooperation” between both 
countries Coast Guard would have the important role in strengthening the Philippines and China bilateral 
relations (Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines', 2017).  
In addition to that, both sides also emphasized the importance of Coast Guard diplomacy. The Joint 
Coast Guard has adopted the guideline implementation of the MOU and the Terms of Reference (TOR) of 
the Working Group which was created to help the work of the committee. Both countries have agreed to 
cooperate in “preventing and combating drug trafficking sectors and also other transnational crimes, search 
and rescue (SAR), environment protection, and emergency response, for examples, through the exchange 
information, modalities, and also unique pragmatic empowerment activities” for the enforcement agencies 
and the coast guards(the Philippines' Coast Guard, 2017). Both countries also created the hotline 
mechanism in order to facilitate the communication in the agreed areas. In order to enhance the 
cooperation between both countries law maritime enforcement agencies, in 2017, both countries agreed 
to conduct the bilateral exchanged activities which including the “maritime operation and exercise, capacity 
building and vessel visit” (the Philippines' Coast Guard, 2017). 
During the second meeting of the JCGC in Guangzhou, China in October 9-11, 2018, both countries 
have agreed to further expand the cooperation by conducting the regular port visit, joint exercises, 
personnel exchange and training also the utilization of the hotline communication. Further, both countries 
also stated and emphasized their willingness to further elevate their bilateral relations and mutual trust to 
obtain their common objectves, such as the increasing of the quality of sea environment, a safer and more 
secure marine environment and  promoting the coast guard diplomacy (the Philippines' Coast Guard, 2018). 
At the end of the meeting, both countries concluded that the Joint Coast Guard Committee was the 
important platform for Manila and Beijing to manage the issue and also to expand the level of  collaboration  
between the two countries and to contribute more peaceful and stable environment in the region (the 
Philippines' Coast Guard, 2018).  
As the continuity of the second meeting of JCGC in 2018, China Coast Guard (CCG) was conducting 
an official visit to the Philippines for the first time on January 14, 2020,  . The CCG visit aims to strengthen 
the dialogue and cooperation on maritime law enforcement of both countries. During the visit, both sides 
agreed to conduct different activities such as cross deck visit, search and rescue and fire fighting exercise, 
and the sport games. The CCG visit was beneficial to deepen mutual trust and understanding of both 
countries and will enhance the cooperation (China Embassy, 2020). During the visit, both sides also agreed 
to conduct the third meeting of JCGC on January 14-16, 2020. During the third meeting of JCGC between 
CCG and the PCG were led by Major General Wang Zhongcai, Director General of CCG, and Vice Admiral 
Joel Sarsiban Gracia, the 28th Commandant of PCG. During the meetings, both sides were discussing about 
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the next cooperation projects and new cooperation fields which aims to increase mutual trusts and to ensure 
the win-win outcomes in maritime cooperation. Besides, both sides have agreed to focus on the fishermen 
safety and protection. Both sides emphasized on their commitment to deepen the cooperation between 
CCG and PCG, jointly addressing maritime emergencies, to concern on the environmental and humanitarian 
protection, and to build the SCS into a sea of peace, stability and prosperity (Li Jiayao, 2020). 
 
Xi Jinping’s State Visit to Philippines’ in 2018 to 2020. 
Related with the Duterte state visit to China in 2016 and 2017 in pursuing more constructive 
bilateral relations Xi Jinping made the two-days state visit to Manila in November 2018 (Jianwei, 2018). 
During this state visit, the two leaders  discussed about the expansion  and the upgrade of economic and 
functional cooperation in several main areas, namely in  investment promotion, bilateral trade, enhancing 
tourism and agriculture, education, science and technology, and cultural exchanged (Embassy of the 
Philippines', 2020).  
On the aspect of SCS dispute, the two countries agreed to further increase the level of mutual trust 
as the basis for better bilateral relations. The two leaders produced the Joint Statement on the South China 
Sea. It has been explicitly stated that:   
“Both sides agree to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities in the South China Sea that 
would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability. Both sides also note the 
importance of confidence-building measures to increase mutual trust and confidence. In this 
regard, both sides affirm the importance of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South 
China Sea and the Joint Coast Guard Committee on Maritime Cooperation”(XinHua, 2018).  
 
In additio to that, both president Rodrigo Duterte and Xi Jinping also witnessed the signing of the 
new updates 29 Government to Government Agreements. The two tables below were the results of Xi 
Jinping state visit to the on November 21, 2018. 
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Table 8: 29 Lists of Agreements and MOU between the Philippines and China Joint Statement 
2018(XinHua, 2018)
 
Table 9: 29 Lists of Agreements and MOU between the Philippines and China Joint Statement 
2018(XinHua, 2018).
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As can be seen in the two tables above (table 8 and table 9), there were 29 list of agreements which 
have been signed by both countries. During the joint press conference, Xi Jinping has emphasized that 
China and the Philippines’ are having common interests and the two countries would keep continue to work 
together to manage the contentious issue and also promote the friendly maritime cooperation through 
bilateral consultation in the SCS(Jianwei, 2018).  
As the continuity of China-Philippines Joint Statement on November 2018, Rodrigo Duterte was 
conducting the state visit to Beijing upon Xi Jinping invitation to attend the 2019 International Basketball 
Federation, Basketball World Cup which was held in Beijing.  
During the meeting, both presidents discussed about the human rights and the SCS issue, on the 
human rights discussion, Xi Jinping stated that he would always support the Philippines national sovereignty 
and to resist on external interference (FMPRC, 2019). Xi Jinping also stated that China and the Philippines 
were committed to maintaining the effective communication in managing the SCS dispute in a proper way 
(FMPRC, 2019). During the meeting, both countries also restated that the Code of Conduct in the SCS is a 
pioneering effort to set the rules and regulation in the SCS in which China and the Philippines had to commit 
more to promote the adoption of the COC to maintain the long term stability in the SCS region (FMPRC, 
2019). 
As started from 2020 the Corona Virus is starting to expand in China, both countries didn’t conduct 
any meeting until September 2020. In September 11, 2020, China’s State Councilor and Defense Minister 
Wei Fenghe was visiting Manila in to discuss about the SCS dispute (CGTN News, 2020). During the meeting, 
Duterte was expressing his gratitude for Chinese government and military for supporting the Philippines by 
giving the assistance to fight against the COVID-19. Duterte stated that the state visit during the pandemic 
have shown the importance to maintain the bilateral relations between both countries. During the meeting, 
Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister stated that both countries should strengthen the 
communication and the coordination to properly manage any differences in the SCS dispute (CGTN News, 
2020).  
Both sides were agreed to manage the peace and stability in the SCS region in order to achieve the 
common interests of all countries. During the meeting, Duterte stated that he hoped both countries could 
continue to solve the SCS tensions and differences through negotiations and in respect with the 
international law. As a response, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe emphasized that it was both countries 








The main task of any nation-states in their foreign relations is to make sure the attainment of their 
national interests. It is even more than necessary to any nation-states to do everything they can with 
everything they have to promote their national interests in the dispute and conflict situation. This article 
has shown the efforts of the Philippines under Rodrigo Duterte administration in protecting its national 
interest’s vis a vis China in the South China Sea dipute. 
In order to advancing its national interests as well as to keep its constructive bilateral relations with 
China, Rodrigo Duterte has adopted an independent and “equi-balancing” foreign policy toward China. As 
has been explicated, this foreign policy aims at aims pursuing a closer relation with China in order to gain 
China’s support on the economic aspects of the Philippines national development and politically, creating 
a distance of the Philippines relations with its main ally, United States. 
The main instrument of the “equi-balancing’ policy of Duterte’s is by exercising a cooperative 
maritime diplomacy to China which can be categorized into three aspects. The first is the soft power 
building. This action was conducted by the Philippines in order to earn China’s trust by conducting the state 
visit to China in order to maintan the constructive bilateral relations with China. The second action is 
confidence building by implementing the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) between Philippines’ and 
China in the South China Sea.  The last step is the coalition building with China by conducting the Joint 
Coast Guard Committee (JCGC) between China Coast Guard (CCG) and the Philippines Coast Guard (PCG). 
These agreements were made to strengthen the bond between the two countries in protecting the SCS 
region from the non-traditional security threats, namely: the transnational and national crimes. 
Considering the ongoing dispute in the SCS, it is very imperative for all the claimants to advance 
non-violence behaviors in mitigating any possible open conflicts in the waterways. The use of cooperative 
maritime diplomacy by all the claimant states in the SCS can be concluded as the most essential diplomatic 
instrument in managing the relations among the claimant states. In this context, Philippines has successfully 
implemented its cooperative maritime diplomacy in managing both its bilateral relations with China and  
promoting a more constructive regional stability in the SCS. 
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